



Summer Institute on International Affairs 2014

The US Role in the World

Week 2
Wednesday, July 2
4:00 - 8:00 PM

DUE DATES

Program Description

This week we will interact with two distinct sets of guests as we explore the idea of responsibility to protect (R2P) and the United States' role in the world. R2P is an idea born from the inaction of the international community in the genocides in Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995). Not wanting to impede on the sovereignty of other nations, the international community was frozen, doing nothing to prevent the massacres. After Kofi Annan's speech to the General Assembly in 2000 deploring global paralysis on such issues, the Canadian government founded the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to find an answer to Annan's challenge. Responsibility to Protect doctrine was presented to the UN in December of 2001, highlighting the instances in which countries were obligated to intervene in the domestic politics of another country. The three main pillars of the document were:

1. The State carries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing
2. The international community has a responsibility to assist States in fulfilling this responsibility.
3. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State fails to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective use of force through the UN Security Council.

There were mixed reactions to R2P as some thought the document could be used to justify the invasion of countries under the guise of humanitarian intervention, while others believed it was too difficult to obtain the consensus required to act in situations in which speed was of the utmost importance.

However, humanitarian intervention is not the only tool the US has to combat crises around the world. In 2012, over \$30 billion was committed to foreign aid, funding counterterrorism operations, humanitarian assistance and economic growth among other things.

Joining us in this discussion will be two of the Council's Veteran Fellows. Each year The World Affairs Council Veteran Fellowship program seeks to engage post-9/11 veterans in discussions on issues of global importance. The goal is to enrich the Council's conversations on current world topics to include the unique perspective and life experience held by veterans. The Council values new voices that can be shared with our intellectually curious and globally-minded audience.

Required Reading #1:

Does the United States have a 'responsibility to protect' the Syrian people?

Michael Abramowitz

Washington Post

September 6, 2013

The "responsibility to protect" — known in international-relations circles as R2P — is a straightforward, if often misunderstood, notion: Nations must protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and must take action to help other nations whose governments can't or won't protect their peoples.

It's hard to see how R2P would not apply in the case of Syria, where more than 100,000 people have been killed, 5 million displaced from their homes, 2 million refugees sent fleeing and numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity committed, including with [chemical weapons](#), according to independent human rights monitors and the United Nations. A [recent study](#) for the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum concluded that genocidal violence against Christian, Sunni, Alawite and other groups is possible if the conflict escalates.

Yet there is one person who has studiously avoided invoking R2P: President Obama. When making the case for airstrikes, he has stressed the need to enforce the worldwide ban on the use and production of chemical weapons. "When there's a breach this brazen of a norm this important, and the international community is paralyzed and frozen and doesn't act, then that norm begins to unravel," Obama warned in a Friday news conference at [the G-20 summit](#) in St. Petersburg.

Yet the chemical weapons ban is not the only international norm at stake in the Syrian civil war. Although the U.S. government has endorsed R2P — most recently in the president's [2010 National Security Strategy](#) — U.S. officials appear unenthusiastic about invoking it as a rationale for combating mass murder and atrocities. While the Syrian conflict has grown in scale and intensity, Obama and his aides have not used "responsibility to protect" to rally the international community to help civilians.

Of course, R2P is not the only tool the administration has to address genocide and other mass atrocities. Officials say their policy is to work aggressively to stop such crimes, though not necessarily through the prism of R2P. Asked about the doctrine at her July confirmation hearing to be ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power said it is "less important, I think, than U.S. practice and U.S. policy, which is that when civilians are being murdered by their governments or by nonstate actors, it's incumbent on us to look to see [what we] might do in order to ameliorate the situation."

The Obama administration's apparent distancing from R2P speaks to the tremendous challenge of mobilizing Americans — whether politicians or the public — to support action on humanitarian grounds. Saving lives is a hard sell these days.

Developed in the early part of the last decade, after the genocide in Rwanda and the failed efforts to prevent massive violence in the Balkans, R2P was supposed to help bypass the idea that has blocked effective action against genocide since the Holocaust: that state sovereignty prohibits countries from meddling in others' internal affairs.

Adopted by U.N. member states (including Syria) at the 2005 World Summit in New York, R2P places the onus for protecting civilians on governments themselves; only if they fail to protect their own civilians — or even worse, if they attack them — should the international community step in. Even then, military action is supposed to be a last resort, and only after approval by the U.N. Security Council.

There have been reasonable criticisms of R2P. It does little to address the roadblocks in the Security Council that have often impeded effective action against countries perpetrating atrocities. Nations in the developing world complain that it is a cover for regime change by Western countries, such as in Libya.

But R2P has been a useful frame for focusing diplomacy and peace-building efforts in a number of countries at risk of horrific violence against civilians. In Kenya, for example, the United Nations and some governments used R2P as a rallying cry for their work, along with Kenyans themselves, to prevent the violence that some expected after this year's presidential elections. Similarly, in 2011, as South Sudan prepared for its historic referendum and ultimate separation from Khartoum after a devastating 23-year civil war, R2P's preventive powers were brought into high relief. An international coalition — including such unlikely allies as Russia, China, Norway, the Arab League, the African Union and the United States — “flooded the zone” with preventive diplomacy, expanded peacekeeping mandates and used high-level political involvement to ensure that the separation did not ignite new bouts of violence.

However unpopular or unknown R2P might be in the United States, it has emerged as a preferred vehicle in other parts of the world for mobilizing support for action against potential mass atrocities. Even China and Russia have endorsed the concept, and in the case of Libya, they allowed an intervention justified in the name of R2P to go forward. It is usually in the hardest, most extreme cases, such as Syria — where it is too late for prevention and diplomatic efforts have not deterred the regime from slaughtering its citizens — that R2P has failed to erase the polarizing debates over military intervention.

The official U.S. reticence to emphasize the “responsibility to protect” reflects, in part, a bipartisan reluctance to sign on to anything that smacks of the United Nations. Another possible drawback to R2P is the erroneous perception that it requires a military deployment or other steps that Americans may not believe are in the national interest. R2P contemplates a range of preventive moves intended to forestall the need for military force. If properly working, it should be a stimulus for international action, not a straightjacket.

Ironically, the U.S. government has initiatives that could improve its capacity to implement R2P. The intelligence community recently completed its first-ever National Intelligence Estimate on mass atrocities, a document that should focus policymakers' attention on countries at risk of genocide or crimes against humanity. The Pentagon has created a planning doctrine on how to

respond to mass atrocities, and such outposts as the U.S. Africa Command now routinely include atrocity-prevention missions in their scenario planning. A new White House-led [Atrocities Prevention Board](#), while hectored by some for appearing feckless in the face of violence in Sudan and Congo, is highlighting the need for new tools for nonmilitary prevention and response, such as a global sanctions system that would target perpetrators and could lessen the need for military action.

At its core, R2P works best in prevention. If the world had thought of Syria as an R2P problem two years ago, when only a handful of protesters had been shot dead by the Assad regime, we might have brought much greater financial, legal and diplomatic tools to bear and been in much better shape than we are today, facing only unpalatable options for halting the slaughter. Americans' understandable reluctance to get involved in more military actions abroad makes it imperative that such tools be further developed. Our best chance to rid the world of genocide and other forms of mass atrocity will be in trying to make sure they don't begin.

Source:

Abramowitz, Michael. "Does the United States Have a 'responsibility to Protect' the Syrian People?" *Washington Post*. The Washington Post, 6 Sept. 2013. Web. 24 June 2014.

Required Reading #2:

The True Cost of Humanitarian Intervention

Benjamin A. Valentino
Foreign Affairs
November, 2011

As forces fighting Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi consolidated control of Tripoli in the last days of August 2011, many pundits began speaking of a victory not just for the rebels but also for the idea of humanitarian intervention. In Libya, advocates of intervention argued, U.S. President Barack Obama had found the formula for success: broad regional and international support, genuine burden sharing with allies, and a capable local fighting force to wage the war on the ground. Some even heralded the intervention as a sign of an emerging Obama doctrine.

It is clearly too soon for this kind of triumphalism, since the final balance of the Libyan intervention has yet to be tallied. The country could still fall into civil war, and the new Libyan government could turn out to be little better than the last. As of this writing, troubling signs of infighting among the rebel ranks had begun to emerge, along with credible reports of serious human rights abuses by rebel forces.

Yet even if the intervention does ultimately give birth to a stable and prosperous democracy, this outcome will not prove that intervention was the right choice in Libya or that similar interventions should be attempted elsewhere. To establish that requires comparing the full costs of intervention with its benefits and asking whether those benefits could be achieved at a lower cost. The evidence from the last two decades is not promising on this score. Although humanitarian intervention has undoubtedly saved lives, Americans have seriously underappreciated the moral, political, and economic price involved.

This does not mean that the United States should stop trying to promote its values abroad, even when its national security is not at risk. It just needs a different strategy. Washington should replace its focus on military intervention with a humanitarian foreign policy centered on saving

lives by funding public health programs in the developing world, aiding victims of natural disasters, and assisting refugees fleeing violent conflict. Abandoning humanitarian intervention in most cases would not mean leaving victims of genocide and repression to their fate. Indeed, such a strategy could actually save far more people, at a far lower price.

THE INTERVENTION CONSENSUS

As the Cold War ended, many foreign policy analysts predicted that the United States would return to isolationism. Without the need to counter the Soviet Union, it was argued, Americans would naturally turn inward. It hardly needs saying that these predictions have not been borne out. Throughout the 1990s, the United States continued to play the leading role in global affairs, maintaining military bases around the world and regularly intervening with military force. The 9/11 attacks only reinforced this pattern. Politicians from both parties today regard the deployment of military forces as a routine part of international relations.

It was not always this way. Although isolationism among conservatives went virtually extinct in the 1950s, during the Cold War, and especially after Vietnam, liberals almost always opposed the use of military force, even for humanitarian purposes. But after the Soviet Union collapsed, many on the left began to embrace the idea that the vast military capabilities assembled to check its influence could now be used to save lives rather than destroy them. The evaporation of Soviet power also made it easier to use those forces, lifting one of the most important constraints on the deployment of U.S. troops abroad. The astonishing success of the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, meanwhile, convinced many people that Americans had finally lost their aversion to intervention abroad, kicking the "Vietnam syndrome" once and for all. The costs of using force appeared to have fallen dramatically.

The end of the Cold War also touched off a bloody civil war in Yugoslavia, the first major conflict in Europe in almost 50 years. Although the United States had few national security interests at stake there, the brutal nature of the fighting prompted many calls for intervention, mostly from the left. These calls did not move President George H. W. Bush to intervene in the Balkans, but his decision to send forces to Somalia in 1992 was partially an effort to demonstrate that he was willing to use the military for humanitarian missions if the conditions were favorable. Under President Bill Clinton, the United States went further, undertaking major humanitarian interventions in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo. A surprising number of opinion-makers on the left, including Peter Beinart, Thomas Friedman, Christopher Hitchens, Michael Ignatieff, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, later lent their support to the 2003 invasion of Iraq out of the conviction that it would end decades of human rights abuses by Saddam Hussein.

Prominent Democrats also called on the United States to use military force to end the mass killings in Darfur, Sudan. In 2007, then Senator Joe Biden told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "I would use American force now. . . . I think it's not only time not to take force off the table. I think it's time to put force on the table and use it." During the 2008 Democratic presidential primary race, Hillary Clinton repeatedly called for the imposition of a no-fly zone in Sudan. Most recently, in March, Obama defended the intervention in Libya, saying, "There will be times . . . when our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and values are. . . . In such cases, we should not be afraid to act." The public agreed: a poll conducted days after NATO began air strikes against Libya found that, even with two other ongoing wars, majorities of both Democrats and Republicans supported the military action. Only self-described independents were more likely to disapprove than approve.

TALLYING THE COSTS

Proponents of such interventions usually make their case in terms of the United States' moral responsibilities. Yet perhaps the most important costs incurred by military interventions have been moral ones. On the ground, the ethical clarity that advocates of human rights have associated with such actions -- saving innocent lives -- has almost always been blurred by a much more complicated reality.

To begin with, aiding defenseless civilians has usually meant empowering armed factions claiming to represent these victims, groups that are frequently responsible for major human rights abuses of their own. Although advocates of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s frequently compared the atrocities of that period to the Holocaust, the moral calculus of intervening in these conflicts was inevitably more problematic. The Tutsi victims of Hutu *génocidaires* in Rwanda and the Bosnian Muslim and Kosovar Albanian victims of Serbian paramilitaries in the former Yugoslavia were just as innocent as the Jewish victims of the Nazis during World War II. But the choice to aid these groups also entailed supporting the less than upstanding armed factions on their side.

In Bosnia, for example, the United States eventually backed Croatian and Bosnian Muslim forces in an effort to block further aggression by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. These forces were far less brutal than the Serbian forces, but they were nevertheless implicated in a number of large-scale atrocities. In August 1995, for example, Croatian forces drove more than 100,000 Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia from their homes, killing hundreds of civilians in what *The New York Times* described as "the largest single 'ethnic cleansing' of the war." It was later revealed that the U.S. State Department had allowed private U.S. military consultants to train the Croatian army in preparation for the offensive. In April of this year, two Croatian military leaders in charge of the campaign were convicted of crimes against humanity at The Hague.

Similarly, after the NATO bombing campaign in 1999 helped evict Serbian forces from Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army turned on the Serbian civilians remaining in the province and in neighboring Macedonia, killing hundreds and forcing thousands to flee. Since the end of the war, human rights groups and the Council of Europe have repeatedly called for investigations of high-ranking KLA officials suspected of engaging in executions, abductions, beatings, and even human organ trafficking.

In comparison with the other ways to save lives abroad, military interventions begins to look almost extravagant.

Another set of moral costs stems not from the unsavory behavior of the groups being protected but from the unavoidable consequences of military intervention. Even if the ends of such actions could be unambiguously humanitarian, the means never are. Using force to save lives usually involves taking lives, including innocent ones. The most advanced precision-guided weapons still have not eliminated collateral damage altogether. Many Americans remember the 18 U.S. soldiers who died in Somalia in 1993 in the "Black Hawk down" incident. Far fewer know that U.S. and UN troops killed at least 500 Somalis on that day and as many as 1,500 during the rest of the mission -- more than half of them women and children.

In Kosovo, in addition to between 700 and several thousand Serbian military deaths, Human Rights Watch estimates that NATO air strikes killed more than 500 civilians. NATO pilots, ordered to fly above 10,000 feet to limit their own losses, found it difficult to distinguish between

friend and foe on the ground. Sixteen civilians were also killed when NATO bombed a Serbian television station that it accused of spreading pro-government propaganda. These and other incidents led Human Rights Watch to conclude that NATO had violated international humanitarian law in its conduct of the war. Amnesty International accused NATO of war crimes.

Although military interventions are calculated to increase the costs of human rights abuses for those who commit them, perhaps interventions' most perverse consequence has been the way they have sometimes actually done the opposite. If perpetrators simply blame the victims for the setbacks and suffering inflicted by the intervention, the incentives to retaliate against victim groups, and possibly even popular support for such retaliation, may rise. Foreign military interventions can change victims from being viewed as a nuisance into being seen as powerful and traitorous enemies, potentially capable of exacting revenge, seizing power, or breaking away from the state. Under these conditions, even moderates are more likely to support harsh measures to meet such threats. And with most humanitarian missions relying on airpower to avoid casualties, potential victims have little protection from retaliation.

In Kosovo, for example, the NATO bombing campaign hardened Serbian opinion against the Kosovar Albanians and rallied public support behind Milosevic, at least initially. Many Serbs donned T-shirts with a bull's-eye and attended anti-NATO rock concerts to express their solidarity against the West and for Milosevic's regime. One Serb told a reporter, "When Milosevic thought he could do whatever he wanted with us, I was against him. Now I am against NATO because they are strong and we are weak." Still worse, the bombing may have actually provoked a major upsurge in the violence, or at least given Milosevic the excuse he needed to implement a long-held plan to ethnically cleanse the region. Either way, when Serbian attacks on Kosovars escalated, NATO planes were flying too high and too fast to protect civilians on the ground.

The prospect of foreign military intervention also may encourage victims to rise up -- a perilous course of action if the intervening forces are not equipped to protect them or if the intervention arrives too late or not at all. Perhaps the most clear-cut example of this perverse dynamic occurred in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. During the war, Bush said the Iraqis should "take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside." Many Iraqi Kurds and Shiites responded to this call, believing that the United States would send military forces to assist them or at least protect them from retaliation by Saddam. It was not to be. Wishing to avoid a quagmire, Bush decided to end the war just 100 hours after the ground invasion had begun. Saddam responded to the domestic uprisings with extreme brutality, killing perhaps 20,000 Kurds and 30,000-60,000 Shiites, many of them civilians.

Another set of costs associated with humanitarian interventions are political. The United States' humanitarian interventions have won the country few new friends and worsened its relations with several powerful nations. The United States' long-term security depends on good relations with China and Russia, perhaps more than any other countries, but U.S.-sponsored interventions have led to increasing distrust between Washington and these nations. Both countries face serious secessionist threats and strongly opposed U.S. intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo out of fear of setting an unwelcome precedent. The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, which killed three Chinese citizens, resulted in major demonstrations outside the U.S. embassy in Beijing and an acute deterioration of relations between the two countries that lasted almost a year. Conflict with Russia over Kosovo continues to this day.

The political strains have not been limited to relations with potential U.S. adversaries. Brazil and India, two of the United States' most important democratic allies in the developing world, also opposed the intervention in Kosovo and have refused to recognize its independence. More recently, both countries sided with China and Russia and condemned the intervention in Libya, arguing that NATO's actions significantly exceeded what the UN Security Council had authorized.

A less tangible political cost of these interventions has been their corrosive effect on the authority of international organizations such as the UN. In regard to Kosovo, the threat that China and Russia would veto a resolution to intervene in the UN Security Council forced proponents of intervention to insist that the mission did not require UN authorization. A few years later, however, many of these one-time advocates found themselves arguing against U.S. intervention in Iraq, at least in part on the grounds that Washington had failed to obtain UN approval. Having ignored the UN when it came to Kosovo and Iraq, it will be more difficult for the United States to condemn the use of force by other states that fail to obtain UN approval.

OPPORTUNITIES LOST

Perhaps the most frequently ignored costs of humanitarian interventions, however, have been what economists call opportunity costs -- the forgone opportunities to which the resources for a military mission might have been put. These costs are considerable, since military intervention is a particularly expensive way to save lives.

Each of the more than 220 Tomahawk missiles fired by the U.S. military into Libya, for example, cost around \$1.4 million. In Somalia, a country of about 8.5 million people, the final bill for the U.S. intervention totaled more than \$7 billion. Scholars have estimated that the military mission there probably saved between 10,000 and 25,000 lives. To put it in the crudest possible terms, this meant that Washington spent between \$280,000 and \$700,000 for each Somali it spared. As for Bosnia, if one assumes that without military action a quarter of the two million Muslims living there would have been killed (a highly unrealistic figure), the intervention cost \$120,000 per life saved. Judging the 2003 Iraq war -- now a multitrillion-dollar adventure -- primarily on humanitarian grounds, the costs would be orders of magnitude higher.

The lesson that many human rights advocates have drawn from these calculations is not that intervention is too costly but that it is no substitute for prevention. A careful study commissioned by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, for example, concluded that early but robust efforts at conflict prevention were almost always more cost-effective than reactive interventions. If only the math were so simple: this argument seriously underestimates the full costs of preventive efforts by assuming that the international community will correctly identify catastrophes long before they occur and intervene only in those cases. In reality, predicting which hot spots will turn violent is extremely difficult. As then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali told reporters in Sarajevo in 1992, although the situation there seemed dire, his job was to think about all the conflicts around the world that might benefit from intervention. "I understand your frustration," he said, "but you have a situation that is better than ten other places in the world. . . . I can give you a list." Thus, although the costs of prevention in any given conflict would surely be much lower than the costs of a purely reactive intervention, these costs must be multiplied many times over because forces would end up intervening in crises that were never going to rise to a level that would have justified military intervention.

What is more, the record of low-cost preventive missions has been at least as bad as the record of interventions reacting to atrocities. One of the most tragic aspects of the genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur was that international peacekeepers were present during some of the worst episodes of violence, such as the slaughter of some 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995, which was witnessed by 400 UN peacekeepers. The problem in these cases was not that no one was sent to prevent the violence; it was that the forces that were deployed were not given the resources or the mandates to stop the violence breaking out around them. In some cases, they could not even protect themselves. More robust preventive deployments might have been more effective, but they would not have been cheap.

MORE FOR THE MONEY

To be sure, \$120,000 or even \$700,000 does not seem like an unreasonably high price to pay to save a life; developed countries routinely value the lives of their citizens much more highly. Although these costs may seem low in absolute terms, in comparison to the other ways the United States' scarce resources might have been spent to save lives abroad, humanitarian intervention begins to look almost extravagant. Three strategies offer the prospect of helping more people with a much lower moral, political, and economic cost: investing in international public health initiatives, sending relief aid to victims of natural disasters and famines, and assisting refugees fleeing violent conflict. Millions more lives could be saved if the billions of dollars spent on humanitarian interventions were instead spent on these efforts.

International public health programs are almost certainly the most cost-effective way to save lives abroad. The World Health Organization estimates that every year at least two million people die from vaccine-preventable diseases alone (millions more die from other easily treatable infectious diseases, such as malaria or infectious diarrhea). This is an annual toll more than twice as large as the Rwandan genocide and more than 200 times the number of civilians who died in Kosovo. Measles alone killed more than 160,000 people in 2008, almost all of them children. It costs less than \$1 to immunize a child against measles, and since not every unvaccinated child would have died from measles, the cost per life saved comes out to an estimated \$224. Even using the exceedingly generous estimates above of the number of lives saved by military intervention, this means that on a per-life basis, measles vaccination would be 3,000 times as cost-effective as the military intervention in Somalia and more than 500 times as cost-effective as the intervention in Bosnia. The provision of antimalarial bed nets may be more efficient still -- costing only between \$100 and \$200 per life saved. The final bill may be even lower, since preventive public health expenditures such as these often more than pay for themselves in averted medical costs and increased productivity.

The lifesaving potential of such public health programs is enormous. Indeed, because of intensive vaccination initiatives, measles deaths have dropped by almost 80 percent since 2000, probably saving well over four million lives in the last ten years. And of course, vaccinating children for measles did not require killing anyone, violating international laws, or damaging important relationships with powerful countries.

A second way that the United States can save lives without the use of force is through disaster-relief efforts. The International Red Cross estimates that more than one million people were killed between 2000 and 2009 in natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes. It is difficult to estimate how many lives were saved by international relief efforts in these disasters or how many more might have been saved had even greater resources been devoted to disaster preparedness and response. Disaster-relief programs are almost certainly less

economically efficient in saving lives than the most effective public health programs, but like public health efforts, they avoid many of the moral and political costs of military intervention. Few forms of intervention are more deeply appreciated by recipients. After the U.S. military sent rescue and medical teams and emergency supplies to Indonesia in the wake of the devastating 2004 tsunami, the proportion of Indonesians who held favorable views of the United States, which had plummeted following the invasion of Iraq, more than doubled -- an important gain in the world's largest Muslim country.

A third set of strategies focuses on aiding potential victims of violent conflict and repression, including genocide and mass killing. Although using military forces to halt perpetrators and protect victims on the ground is usually very expensive, it is possible to assist victims of violent conflict at much lower cost by helping them escape to safer areas. Large refugee flows are rightly seen as humanitarian emergencies in themselves, but refugees of violence are also survivors of violence. In practice, measures designed to help victims reach safety across international borders and to care for refugee populations once they arrive have probably saved more lives from conflict than any other form of international intervention.

History provides numerous examples that illustrate the potential of providing safe havens for refugees. Although the Nazis clamped down on emigration after World War II began, between 1933 and 1939 Germany actively encouraged it, a process that ultimately resulted in the exodus of approximately 70 percent of Germany's Jews. Had Western nations put up fewer barriers to Jewish immigration or actively sought to assist Jewish emigration, they would surely have saved many more lives. The ability of potential victims to escape likely played an even greater role in limiting the toll from repressive governments during the Cold War. Following the communist takeover in North Korea, for example, more than one million people, around ten percent of the population living above the 38th parallel, made their way to the South between 1945 and 1947. Had they been unable to flee, many would surely have been labeled enemies of the state and executed or sent to the North Korean gulag. Similarly, roughly 3.5 million Chinese refugees, mostly supporters of Chiang Kai-shek who would have been prime targets of Mao Zedong's subsequent campaigns against political enemies, escaped to Taiwan and Hong Kong following the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Today, many of the 250,000 Sudanese refugees surviving in camps in eastern Chad likely would have joined the 300,000-400,000 victims of the mass killing in Darfur had they not fled the fighting.

The first order of business, then, should be for outside powers to keep their borders open to victims fleeing violence. The large numbers of refugees who managed to escape the bloodshed in North Korea, China, and Kosovo were able to do so only because they could flee across open borders into neighboring states. Many victims are not so fortunate. For example, Iraqi Kurdish refugees attempting to flee the crackdown following the Gulf War initially faced closed borders as they tried to go to Iran and Turkey. Diplomatic pressure and economic assistance from the United States and NATO, however, ultimately prompted these countries to open their borders, at least temporarily.

Even when neighboring states are willing to open their doors, perpetrators often try to block victims' escape. Such was the case in Rwanda, where Hutu *génocidaires* set up roadblocks to prevent Tutsis from crossing into Burundi, Congo, Tanzania, and Uganda. In cases like these, the use of limited military force may make sense. In Rwanda, a relatively small military intervention, perhaps with airpower alone, could have destroyed roadblocks and secured key escape routes, helping tens of thousands reach safety. By one estimate, this strategy might have saved 75,000 lives.

The international community should also ensure the survival of refugees once they reach their destinations. The conditions awaiting most refugees of mass violence seldom provide much better odds of survival than do those faced by victims who remain behind. Not only are food, water, and shelter in short supply, but refugees are also frequently subject to violence and thievery at the hands of other refugees or local populations. Few refugees would survive for long without substantial external assistance. As a result, when the options for potential refugees are unattractive, many will prefer to stay and fight, even when their chances of success are slim. When refugees can expect more hospitable conditions across the border, however, more will choose to flee and more will survive when they arrive.

HUMBLE HUMANITARIANISM

Proponents of humanitarian intervention may object that the calculus laid out here understates its effectiveness by neglecting the other U.S. interests that these military missions serve. Even the most ardent advocates of intervention in such places as Kosovo, Sudan, or Libya, however, usually concede that the United States' safety was never directly threatened by the crises there. At the same time, helping refugees and saving lives through public health programs and disaster relief also serve a variety of secondary U.S. interests -- improving relations with other countries, promoting economic development, and increasing regional stability. A full accounting cannot neglect these benefits, either.

Some may also protest that the United States cannot give up on humanitarian intervention since it is the only country with the capability to project power around the globe. This may be true, but it would be a relevant concern only if other countries or nongovernmental organizations were already devoting sufficient resources to nonmilitary forms of humanitarian aid. The millions of easily preventable deaths that still occur every year are evidence that much more is needed. Still others may assert that the United States has a special responsibility to oppose governments that are engaged in massive human rights violations, even at much greater cost, because doing so sends a message that the world will not tolerate crimes against humanity and despotism. But that message need not be sent with bombs. A stronger message, in fact, should be sent to governments that fail to provide even inexpensive health care or essential services to save the lives of their own citizens. Finally, some will argue that the United States does not need to choose between military intervention and humanitarian aid since it can afford both. This is correct, but given the number of people who could benefit from increased humanitarian aid, the country will have to vaccinate many more children and assist many more refugees before military intervention begins to look affordable in comparison.

The strategies suggested here are not without their own dilemmas, of course. Large refugee populations can foster instability if the refugees attempt to fight their way home or fall into conflict with local populations. And humanitarians have learned the hard way that relief aid and medical supplies can be hijacked by corrupt governments or violent rebel groups. Fortunately, these problems are less severe than the problems of military intervention, and there are ways to mitigate them, even if they cannot be eliminated altogether. The provision of humanitarian aid should be more closely monitored, the aid should be linked to other forms of aid that recipients desire, and the aid should be targeted to those countries and local groups that demonstrate that they can use it most effectively. Strategies to assist refugees must be combined with diplomatic coercion and tough economic sanctions designed to end the conflicts that forced the refugees out in the first place. With defenseless victims out of harm's way, international pressure on perpetrators would be much less likely to provoke further crackdowns.

As with most of the choices in international relations, these strategies are simply the best of a poor set of alternatives. Even so, a foreign policy based on them would not mean simply standing by in the face of atrocity and injustice. Indeed, efforts such as helping refugees could save thousands of lives even when a major military intervention is out of the question. Equally important, these strategies would do much to allow Americans to wholeheartedly embrace a less militarized foreign policy, restoring the United States' image as a force for good in the world and providing Americans with an alternative perspective on the use of force, something that has been absent from U.S. foreign policy debates. U.S. foreign policy has always sought to promote the values of its citizens, as well as protect their material and security interests abroad. The country should not abandon that noble impulse now. It simply needs a better way to act on it.

Source:

Valentino, Benjamin A. "The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention." *Global. Foreign Affairs*, Nov. 2011. Web. 24 June 2014.

Required Reading #3:

Obama Says U.S. Will No Longer Be the World's Policeman

Gordon Lubold
Foreign Policy
May 28, 2014

President Obama told a crowd of cadets at West Point that the United States remains an "indispensable nation" that will face down terrorism threats around the world and work to bolster key allies while avoiding costly, open-ended wars. But amid Republican criticism that Obama has diminished America's standing globally, the high-profile address likely handed his opponents new support for their claim that he's more interested in a domestic agenda than one in which he'd be willing to intervene in a place like Syria, now in the third year of a bloody civil war.

Obama, speaking at the U.S. Military Academy's commencement ceremony today, said terrorism remains "the most direct threat to America at home and abroad" and stressed that the United States won't refrain from taking direct action against militants if it has actionable intelligence. He also announced a new \$5 billion counterterrorism fund conceived to help the United States train allies in the Middle East and North Africa so they could battle their own homegrown extremists with little to no U.S. help. Administration officials pointed to Africa, where the military has ramped up its efforts to help the militaries of countries like Mali, Chad, and Niger.

Obama, considered by many of his critics to be a reluctant wartime president, also took pains to lower any expectation that the U.S. military should or would be America's primary tool for fixing whatever ails the world.

"The military that you have joined is, and always will be, the backbone of that leadership," Obama told the graduating cadets at West Point. "But U.S. military action cannot be the only -- or even primary -- component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail."

The president's remarks came just one day after he announced a new plan for Afghanistan in which some 9,800 troops would remain in that country after 2014 to train the Afghan security

forces and mount counterterror operations, but with all but a handful of security forces supporting the embassy withdrawing by the end of 2015.

Although there has been speculation for weeks that the White House would expand its program to train and arm the Syrian opposition, and perhaps [Obama would use Wednesday's speech to outline it](#), Obama was decidedly noncommittal. The administration has long stressed that the U.S. military wouldn't intervene in the conflict and that it was committed to a diplomatic solution to the brutal civil war. Those efforts have collapsed in recent weeks, but Obama didn't acknowledge that diplomacy was no longer making any progress and offered only broad brushstrokes about what the United States would do to help.

"As frustrating as it is, there are no easy answers -- no military solution that can eliminate the terrible suffering anytime soon," Obama said of Syria. "As president, I made a decision that we should not put American troops into the middle of this increasingly sectarian civil war, and I believe that is the right decision."

A senior administration official briefing reporters after the speech had few other details, putting the responsibility for authorizing such assistance on Congress' doorstep and hinting that it could be several more months before Syrian rebels see any new assistance. Asked if the White House had settled on a plan to assist Syrian rebels, the official hinted that it had not.

"This is something we'll be discussing with Congress in the coming weeks and months," the official said.

Some of the details that did emerge during the speech also undercut some of the president's own arguments. Some of the money in the proposed new counterterrorism fund would help pay for humanitarian assistance in Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan, all of which have seen the spillover effects of the Syrian war in the form of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. That could reduce, perhaps substantially, the amount of money that would go towards training and equipping allied armed forces.

Typical of Obama's vision of the use of military forces to "build capacity" among partner nations is a plan underway since last year in which U.S. Special Operations troops are creating elite counterterrorism units in North and West Africa, including Libya, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. The program, [first reported by the New York Times](#) this week, uses the Army's Green Berets and the secretive Delta Force to help create indigenous forces capable of fighting militants in those countries such as those from Boko Haram, an Islamist group that kidnapped about 275 schoolgirls in a remote region of northern Nigeria.

"I believe we must shift our counterterrorism strategy -- drawing on the successes and shortcomings of our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan -- to more effectively partner with countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold," Obama said, noting how such moves are a reflection of today's "principal threat," which comes from a decentralized al Qaeda in which the group's affiliates and other extremists pose the biggest threats in those countries.

"We need a strategy that matches this diffuse threat; one that expands our reach without sending forces that stretch our military thin, or stir up local resentments."

Obama also committed, once again, to providing more transparency about the military operations he oversees, echoing comments [he made more than a year ago at National Defense](#)

[University](#) in which he argued for more openness in terms of America's targeted killings of militants abroad. But little of that effort has come to pass.

As Foreign Policy [first reported in November](#), the expected migration of most drone operations from the CIA to the Defense Department has been on hold for months and is still not expected to happen anytime soon. CIA operations fall under what's known as "Title 50" operations and are therefore covert; Defense Department drone operations are, for the most part, overt and therefore subject to more Congressional oversight.

Obama's reinvigorated efforts to have more operations overseas out in the open come as Sen. Rand Paul, the Republican from Kentucky, threatened to hold up the judicial nomination of David Barron, who wrote a legal opinion in support of the Obama White House's killing of American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in 2011. Barron was ultimately confirmed on a party-line 53-45.

Obama has also failed thus far to make significant headway in closing the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, an objective from his first days in office and reiterated during that speech last year.

Still, as criticism mounts of his foreign policy approach, Obama said he has every intention of shining as much sunlight on those operations as possible.

"I also believe we be more transparent about both the basis for our actions, and the manner in which they are carried out -- whether it is drone strikes, or training partners," he said Wednesday. "I will increasingly turn to our military to take the lead and provide information to the public about our efforts."

Source:

Lubold, Gordon. "Obama Says U.S. Will No Longer Be the World's Policeman." *Foreign Policy*. Foreign Policy, 28 May 2014. Web. 24 June 2014.

Required Reading #4:

Why We Shouldn't Attack Syria (Yet)

Robert A. Pape
New York Times
February 2, 2012

As the death toll in Syria has climbed to perhaps 7,000, proponents of humanitarian intervention are asking, quite reasonably, why the West does not intervene as it did in Libya last year. Not only was Libya's dictator, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, ousted with relatively few Western casualties, but the NATO campaign also set a precedent for successful humanitarian intervention.

In the 63 years since the United Nations adopted a [genocide convention](#) in the wake of the Holocaust, world leaders have failed to prevent the deaths of millions, from Biafra and Cambodia to Rwanda and Darfur — not just because they have lacked the political will to intervene, but also because of the norm of genocide itself. By setting the bar for intervention so high — unmistakable evidence of clear intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group — the international community has stuck itself in a Catch-22: by the time it is clear that genocide is occurring, it is often too late to stop it.

A new standard for humanitarian intervention is needed. If a continuing government-sponsored campaign of mass homicide — in which thousands have died and many thousands more are likely to die — is occurring, a coalition of countries, sanctioned by major international and regional institutions, should intervene to stop it, as long as they have a viable plan, with minimal risk of casualties for the interveners.

The recent war in Libya was a case in point. When large parts of Libya broke away from Colonel Qaddafi's rule, he retaliated with tanks, air power and artillery against heavily populated urban areas. His loyalists promised "rivers of blood." The signs of impending state-sponsored mass murder were clear.

For weeks, the United States and other nations appeared paralyzed, unclear whether Colonel Qaddafi's brutality would reach the level of genocide, while Robert M. Gates, then the defense secretary, fretted about the open-ended costs in the "ouster of a Middle Eastern leader" and the fallout from attacking "yet another Muslim country."

But rather than seeking regime change to prevent genocide, President Obama focused on the narrower objective of preventing "a humanitarian catastrophe" and explicitly ruled out foreign-imposed regime change.

These more modest, pragmatic goals sidestepped Mr. Gates's objections and reflect the emerging new standard for humanitarian intervention. The United States took the lead, but initially only to halt the mass-homicide campaign. And it rightly set goals that would not require an ambitious military commitment.

Libya was a success — and it was as low-risk as any United States military mission of the past 20 years. Colonel Qaddafi's threat to civilians rested on his ability to direct heavy concentrations of weapons against rebel-controlled populated areas and to cut off supplies into ports; NATO airpower could blunt both tactics.

Within weeks, the threat to eastern Libya was minimized, giving the rebel movement breathing space to gain cohesion and battlefield experience and eventually defeat Colonel Qaddafi's small and increasingly unpopular army.

In the past few decades, the United States and other countries have successfully intervened for humanitarian purposes on three other occasions — in 1991, to stop Saddam Hussein's attempted massacre of the Kurds in northern Iraq after the Gulf War, and to protect first Bosnians, in 1993, and then Kosovars, in 1999, from the Serbs' attempts at ethnic cleansing. All three humanitarian interventions occurred after thousands of people had been killed and exponentially more people had been injured or displaced. And all three were successful and saved thousands of lives.

None of these cases, nor the war in Libya, amounted to true genocide, where hundreds of thousands were already dead at the time of intervention. Most important, none could become a genocide because intervention stopped the killing at an earlier stage.

Limited military force to stop campaigns of state-sanctioned homicide is more pragmatic than waiting for irrefutable evidence of "genocide." It will not work in every case, but it will save large numbers of lives. It also promotes restraint in cases where humanitarian intervention would be high-risk or used as a pretext for imperial designs.

As the world's sole military superpower, the United States will be at the center of many future debates over humanitarian action. Rather than hewing to the old standard of intervening only after genocide has been proved, the emerging new standard would allow for meaningful and low-risk military action before the killing gets out of control.

Syria is, I admit, a tough case. It is a borderline example of a government's engaging in mass killings of its citizens. The main obstacle to intervention is the absence of a viable, low-casualty military solution. Unlike Libya, where much of the coastal core of the population lived under rebel control, the opposition to Syria's dictatorial president, Bashar al-Assad, has not achieved sustained control of any major population area. So air power alone would probably not be sufficient to blunt the Assad loyalists entrenched in cities, and a heavy ground campaign would probably face stiff and bloody resistance.

If a large region broke away from the regime en masse, international humanitarian intervention could well become viable. Until then, sadly, Syria is not another Libya. A mass-homicide campaign is under way there, but a means to stop it without unacceptable loss of life is not yet available.

Source:

Pape, Robert A. "Why We Shouldn't Attack Syria (Yet)." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 02 Feb. 2012. Web. 24 June 2014.

Required Reading #5:

Why Libya is not the template for future military statecraft

Daniel W. Drezner
Foreign Policy
August 25, 2011

Fareed Zakaria thinks that the Libya intervention signals "[a new era in U.S. foreign policy](#)":

The United States decided that it was only going to intervene in Libya if it could establish several conditions:

- 1) A local group that was willing to fight and die for change; in other words, "indigenous capacity".
- 2) Locally recognized legitimacy in the form of the Arab League's request for intervention.
- 3) International legitimacy in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.
- 4) Genuine burden sharing with the British and French spelling out precisely how many sorties they would be willing to man and precisely what level of commitment they would be willing to provide....

The new model does two things:

First, it ensures that there's genuinely a local alliance committed to the same goals as the external coalition. This way, there is more legitimacy on the ground. And if there is anything Afghanistan and Iraq have taught us, it is that local legitimacy is key.

Second, this model ensures that there is genuine burden sharing so that the United States is not left owning the country as has happened so often in the past...

In the future, we will again have to follow this limited model of intervention.

This sounds great, except that the set of criteria that Zakaria lists is so stringent that I seriously doubt that they will be satisfied again in my lifetime. Russia and China regretted the U.N. support the minute after it passed, and [the president of the Arab League had buyer's remorse](#) almost immediately after NATO started bombing. Even if the Libya operation looks like a success from here on out, there's no way that list of criteria will be satisfied. Ever.

Now, for those readers worried about the creeping militarization of American foreign policy, this might sound like a *great* idea, as it creates a ridiculously high barrier for military intervention. And, indeed, so long as these criteria are only used to satisfy humanitarian military interventions, it sounds good. Except that most military interventions aren't strictly humanitarian. The moment core national interests kick in, these criteria get downgraded from prerequisites to luxuries.

So Zakaria is wildly inflating the importance of the sui generis nature of the Libya intervention. But that's OK; he's a pundit, not an actual policymaker. There's no way anyone working in the White House, say, would make such a simplistic, facile -- hey, what's in [this Josh Rogin FP interview with Ben Rhodes](#)?

This week's toppling of the Qaddafi regime in Libya shows that the Obama administration's multilateral and light-footprint approach to regime change is more effective than the troop-heavy occupation-style approach used by the **George W. Bush** administration in Iraq and Afghanistan, a top White House official told **Foreign Policy** today in a wide-ranging interview.

"The fact that it is Libyans marching into Tripoli not only provides a basis of legitimacy for this but also will provide contrast to situations when the foreign government is the occupier," said **Ben Rhodes**, deputy national security advisor for communications, in an exclusive interview on Wednesday with **FP**. "While there will be huge challenges ahead, one of the positive aspects here is that the Libyans are the ones who are undertaking the regime change and the ones leading the transition."...

"There are two principles that the president stressed at the outset [of the Libya intervention] that have borne out in our approach. The first is that we believe that it's far more legitimate and effective for regime change to be pursued by an indigenous political movement than by the United States or foreign powers," said Rhodes. "Secondly, we put an emphasis on burden sharing, so that the U.S. wasn't bearing the brunt of the burden and so that you had not just international support for the effort, but also meaningful international contributions."

Rhodes said that the United States is not going to be able to replicate the exact same approach to intervention in other countries, but identified the two core principles of relying on indigenous forces and burden sharing as "characteristics of how the president approaches foreign policy and military intervention."

Excuse me for a second; I have to go do [this](#).

Look, *ceteris paribus*, burden-sharing and local support are obviously nifty things to have. I guarantee you, however, that the time will come when an urgent foreign-policy priority will require some kind of military statecraft, and these criteria will not be met. The Obama administration should know this, since [its greatest success in military statecraft](#) to date **did not satisfy either of these criteria**.

There is always a danger, after a perceived policy success, to declare it as a template for all future policies in that arena. Pundits make this mistake all the time. Policymakers should know better.

Source:

Drezner, Daniel W. "Why Libya Is Not a Template for Future Military Statecraft." *Foreign Policy*. Foreign Policy, 25 Aug. 2011. Web. 24 June 2014.

Required Reading #6:

Active Listening

In our active world of communication one cannot afford to exclude the art of listening. As a leader, you must listen to your constituents in order to be effective. You need to listen and correctly understand all messages from group members.

Active Listening differs from hearing. Hearing is the act of perceiving audible sounds with the ear and is a passive act. Listening, on the other hand, is the active pursuit of understanding what the other person is saying. In active listening, the receiver tries to understand what the sender is saying and what the message means. Active listening includes making eye contact and asking questions to verify that you understand what the speaker is trying to say. To listen actively and to understand is not a passive or simple activity.

The following are important characteristics of a "good listener".

Be Present

You need to hear what he/she has to say. If you don't have the time, or don't want to listen, wait until you do.

Accept

Accept the person as she/he is without judgment or reservation or putting the person in a mental box or category, even though she/he may be very different from you. This can be very important in political discussion in which a person has a set of beliefs that may differ from yours. Just because a person is a Republican, Democrat, Liberal, Anarchist, Realist on some issues does not mean that they are on all issues. People have nuanced views.

Listen

Don't plan what you are going to say. Don't think of how you can interrupt. Don't think of how to solve the problem, how to admonish, how to console or what the person "should" do. DON'T THINK TO STRUGGLE OR REACT...LISTEN! Again, this is particularly important for political discussions in which emotions may run high. Take note of these feelings- but remain attentive.

Stay With the Other Person

Put yourself in the other's shoes. Don't become that person, but understand what he/she is feeling, saying and thinking. Stay separate enough to be objective, but involved enough to help. Ask clarifying questions to make sure you understand what is being said and implied.

Adapted from:
"Active Listening." Holden Leadership Center. Web. 29 Aug. 2011.

Optional Readings:

Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended

Ivo H. Daalder
Brookings Institute
December 1998

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1998/12/balkans-daalder>

An article detailing the violence in the former Yugoslavia and the late international responses to both the Croatian and Bosnian crises, with an eye toward the crisis in Kosovo.

The Responsibility to Protect

United Nations

<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml>

The UN page on R2P with links to the various reports on it to the UN in the last several years.

Rwanda in Retrospect

Alan J. Kuperman
Foreign Affairs
January/February 2000

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55636/alan-j-kuperman/rwanda-in-retrospect>

An excellent piece detailing the causes of the Rwandan genocide and why the international community was so slow in responding.

UN Targets Libya With Pinpoint Accuracy

Gareth Evans
Sydney Morning Herald
March 24, 2011

<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/un-targets-libya-with-pinpoint-accuracy-20110323-1c6pc.html>

An article by Gareth Evans, one of the writers of R2P, detailing the case for intervention in Libya.

Multimedia:

Video

Jennifer Welsh, Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect – 20th Anniversary Rwanda Genocide

United Nations
April 15, 2014

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kAdSotl2OhA>

An interview with UN special adviser Jennifer Welsh on the importance of R2P.

VIDEO/PODCAST

Preventing Genocide: Do We Have a Responsibility to Protect?

World Affairs Council

September 30, 2013

<http://www.worldaffairs.org/media-library/event/1160#.U6CYdFtn6So>

A former World Affairs Council Program with the Director of the Prevention of Genocide, Mike Abramowitz and former presidential special envoy to Sudan, Richard Williamson, on what role the US should play in preventing atrocities around the world.

Graphics

Foreign Aid Around the World

Finance Degree Center

Council on Foreign Relations

<http://www.financedegreecenter.com/foreign-aid/>

A chart showing the money the US spent on foreign aid and what types of projects the budget funded.